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Them and us: Did Democrat inclusiveness 
and Republican solidarity lead to the 2016 
U.S. Presidential election outcome? 
Abstract 
This research examined the role that group dynamics played in the 
2016 US Presidential election. Just prior to the election, participants 
were assessed on perceived self-similarity to group members’ views, 
perception of own leader’s prototypicality, perceptions of social 
values, and strength of support (attitudes). Results indicated that 
Democrats were more inclusive, seeing more similarity between 
themselves and members from the outgroup political party, while 
Republicans displayed more ingroup solidarity and negative attitudes 
toward outgroup members.  Trump was viewed as a more prototypical 
leader by Republicans than Clinton was by Democrats. These results 
may help to explain the perhaps surprising fragility of Democrat 
voters’ support for Clinton. 
 
Introduction 
On the face of it, the 2016 US Presidential election might have looked like an “upset” 
victory for Donald Trump. However, it is possible to see that Trump and the Republicans 
would clearly win, and that the Democrats and Clinton would lose if viewed from a social 
psychological perspective. If we approach the election as a contest between groups, with 
competing factions, and if we carefully consider group dynamics, it may not be so surprising 
after all.   
This research reports on a survey of likely voters conducted in the week leading up to 
the US Presidential election of 2016. Using this sample of voters from both political parties, 
we sought to examine the prospect of a “winner-takes-all scenario” on the social identities of 
respondents’ own social group (Republican or Democrat), their perceptions of members of 
the other group/party, and of their respective leadership candidates. In viewing the election as 
a contest between social groups, in addition to examining the perceived similarity the 
members had with these social groups, we may better understand the outcome of Trump’s 
election. 
We relied on the group dynamics literature, specifically social identity theory (SIT), 
(Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), as well as the values/belief literature 
(Rokeach, 1973).According to SIT, one reason why people join social groups, Republican or 
Democrat in this case, is because groups provide people with a sense of “belongingness” and 
offer them opportunities to draw both personal and collective esteem (Abrams and Hogg, 
1988). Moreover, in the classical statement of SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; see Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988) it is proposed that groups contribute to their members’ social identity by 
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being positively distinctive from outgroups and by winning either objective or social 
competitions with these outgroups.  However, the theory does not directly address situations 
in which the goal  of the competition is the right to represent the individual members of both 
groups, and it does not consider how this might affect the victor’s perspective on the 
intergroup relationship. Within the context of the US election, and because of the increasing 
polarization of the two political parties, both Republican and Democrat groups were highly 
salient and thus would offer people a powerful group membership and a sense of belonging. 
SIT would expect that when identification is strong, members should report strong similarity 
between their own views and those of members of their ingroup.  Conversely, members 
should feel very little connection to outgroup members of the other political party. 
However, within the context of a competition in which the future of both groups is 
uncertain, and because of the ups and downs of the conflict, it could be very difficult for 
people to be assured of the stability of either group. This might affect the way in which 
members perceive others from their ingroup. To this end, Haslam and Reicher (2007), argue 
that group members are motivated to take advantage of opportunities to act as “identity 
entrepreneurs”.  That is, they are motivated to psychologically incorporate the outgroup as 
part of their ingroup identity, particularly if they feel that their own group truly represents the 
best interests of both groups, as a superordinate whole. In other words, they see their ingroup 
beliefs as more “justified”, and valid (cf. Marques et al., 2001), and are likely to engage in 
ingroup-projection, whereby group members assume that their group is representative of the 
wider American culture (see, Wenzel et al., 2008). While this strategy has a direct benefit for 
the individual – boosting the member’s sense of personal worth – it may come with high 
costs for the collective by eroding ingroup solidarity in relation to the original ingroup as 
members become more open to identifying with the outgroup. 
Another reason why people adopt political affiliations is to reflect their personal 
values (Rokeach, 1973). Values capture enduring interpersonal orientations and principles 
(see Schwartz, 2012).  While a number of values dimensions have been proposed over the 
years, several recent studies indicate that these reduce to two orthogonal dimensions (see 
Duckitt, 2001, for a review; see also Rokeach, 1973; Braithwaite, 1994). In the area of moral 
psychology, Haidt and Graham (2007) characterize these two values dimensions as 
“individualizing,” or an approach that focuses on individuals as the locus, and “binding,” an 
approach that focuses on the group as the locus. Relevant to the election, individualizing has 
been associated with liberal ingroups, and binding has been associated with conservative 
ingroups (also see, Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Conover and Feldman, 1981). This mirrors 
earlier work in which liberal ingroup values were more likely to reflect equality and an 
openness to change, while conservative ingroup values were more likely to include security 
and a desire for order and uncertainty reduction (Jost and Napier, 2012; Jost, 2017). Taken 
together, the pattern emerging is that liberal ingroups are more likely to be characterized as 
endorsing “equality” and “individualized,” or idealism-centred values, whereas conservative 
ingroups are more likely to value “support for security and order, with the group focused on 
relativist-centred behavior, or ones that seek to protect the ingroup relative to other outgroups 
(see, Graham et al., 2013, McHoskey, 1996). 
Closer to the domain of the present research, studies bridging interpersonal values 
(within the moral foundations work) and group processes has demonstrated that values 
mediate the strategies used by ingroups (Morris, 2017; Stewart and Morris, 2018). Stewart 
and Morris (2018), for example, examined the relationship between ingroup values of 
Liberals and Conservatives and their intergroup bias toward immigrants (outgroup; outgroup 
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was not the opposing social group).  In a series of studies, the researchers found that 
Democrat ingroup values of individualizing mediated intergroup bias, helping to suppress the 
negative views of the immigrants.  Conversely, however, Republican ingroup values 
magnified the difference between the ingroup and the outgroup thereby increasing intergroup 
bias against the immigrant outgroups (also see, Sparkman and Eidelman, 2016; Meertens and 
Pettigrew, 1997). 
While the work of Stewart and Morris offers a concrete step forward, but it also has 
some interesting limitations. For example, the strength of ingroup and outgroup similarity 
were not directly measured.  Also, the research was not framed within the context of an 
intergroup competition between liberals and conservatives. Finally, and importantly, it did 
not connect well to the well-established body of literature examining social identity and 
leadership, thereby overlooking the significant identity- entrepreneurial role of the leader as a 
member of the social group (Abrams et al., 2018; Hogg, 2001; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004; 
Reicher et al., 2005). 
Measuring the linkages between the individual and the group is important, because 
that it would provide insights into whether voting preferences more strongly reflect values 
preference or identity needs. If the key factor is values,  then we would expect that the main 
basis for aligning with either the Democrats or Republicans is rooted in the evaluation of 
others as having a similar set of beliefs to the ones held by the self.  If the key factor is group 
identity,  then perceptions, values, and motives would be drawn from the group’s identity and 
would be a part of the construal of the identification, meaning that we could expect values to 
differentiate between the groups (Graham et al., 2013; Duckett, 2001). This would be 
detected by assessing similarity with other ingroup members and subsequently self-
prototypicality.  A central question for social identity theory would center on the extent to 
which the individual internalized the beliefs of the group, and thus reported a stronger sense 
of being “representative” for the group. For example, if self-prototypicality and perceived 
leader prototypicality are both high this would tend to indicate that these individuals would 
support the leader, whereas if one or both is lacking then the leader may be more vulnerable 
to voter apathy or disengagement. Thus, the inter-relationships between values, perceived 
similarity to other members, and one’s sense of representativeness may have a direct effect 
on support for leadership candidates and contest outcomes. 
 
         To answer these questions, we conducted a survey with a sample of US citizens in the 
week leading up to the US Presidential election of 2016. We looked at the differences 
between Republican and Democrat supporters in the associations between perceived values, 
self-group similarity and self and leader prototypicality perceptions of both one’s own social 
group/political party. We proposed a number of hypotheses: 
 
H1: Value congruence. According to SIT, both Republican and Democrats will 
report strong similarity with other ingroup members and low similarity in views with the 
opposing outgroup (i.e., Democrat or Republican depending on the target, respectively).  
 
H2: Group distinctiveness and self-group similarity. Consistent with a perceived 
congruence (Rokeach, 1973), we would expect that ingroup values could motivate the 
formation of social groups, and therefore social values should differentiate between social 
groups.  That is, we would anticipate that the pattern of particular values that are perceived to 
best represent Republicans would be different from those that are perceived to best represent 
Democrats. However, the strength with which the key values are associated with their 
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respective groups should not differ. Also, if values congruence is a key reason for group 
membership, then we would also expect that respondents who perceived their ingroup values 
as more distinctive would also perceive greater  similarity between their own and ingroup 
views.    
 
H3: Strategic identification. Consistent with a strategic identity hypothesis (Marques 
et al., 2001), ingroup values will correlate with ingroup perceived similarity where the group 
highly identifies with the ingroup construct.  However, we reasoned that Democrats’ more 
overarching values may reflect  their motivation to accommodate outgroup members, as 
suggested by Haslam and Reicher (2007). Therefore, Democrats may strategically envisage  
stronger perceived self- similarity with outgroup members.  However, this strategy also 
implies  lower self-ingroup prototypicality, because these more inclusive values imply a less 
distinctive ingroup prototype.   
 
H4: Leader Prototypicality.  Turning to the relationship between leader perceptions, 
leader prototypicality should affect leaders who are perceived as more prototypical and 
evaluated more positively by group members.  Although Trump may be regarded as highly 
idiosyncratic in many ways (such as his prior career path and media coverage), and Clinton 
much more conventional because of political background, these characteristics do not 
necessarily imply that they would be viewed as prototypical of their parties. Indeed, based on 
their values and capacity to capture the central goals of their parties, it is plausible that  
Trump could be regarded as more highly prototypical among Republicans than Clinton is 
among  Democrats. Moreover, because we contend that Republicans are more likely to 
pursue a path of distinctiveness and differentiation from the outgroup, the greater 
distinctiveness of Trump would contribute more strongly to perceptions of his 
prototypicality. Clinton’s more inclusive approach, perhaps ironically, this would make it 
harder for Democrat supporters to view her as a distinctive, and thus prototypical, leader.1  
In sum, adopting an intergroup perspective allow us to answer critical questions about 
the importance of the group and its values in the competition for leadership. The group 
context is often overlooked, but it may be critical in understanding the outcome of this and 
future elections. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
Two hundred and ninety-nine participants were recruited through Amazon’s social research 
platform, MTurk. The mean age was 34.52 years (SD = 10.06 years). The sample was largely 
comprised of single (86.2) people reporting to be educated to at least a high school diploma 
level or greater (86.2%), and approximately half were Caucasian, men and owned their own 
homes. Of the participants, 51% were reportedly Democrats while 49% indicated that they 
were Republicans, and 77.2% had voted in the last election. Each participant was paid $3 for 
his/her participation. 
 
Procedure 
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Participants responded to an advertisement asking for supporters of either candidate: Clinton 
or Trump. They were told the study assessed their social perceptions and that they would be 
asked to comment on the values of both Democratic and Republican social groups.  Next, 
procedures about the confidentiality, data storage, and those of withdrawal from the study 
were explained. Written informed consent was collected. Participants indicated which 
candidate they planned to vote for, and responded to voting behavior questions 
about the candidate they were supporting and asked to complete a series of measures 
assessing group perceptions.  Upon completion, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Measures 
 
Perceived similarity of group members’ views, perception of leader prototypicality, 
perceptions of social values, and strength of support (attitudes) were assessed using the 
following items: 
 
1. Similarity between own views and those of  ingroup members and those of 
outgroup members views. Single item measures were used, assessing the extent to 
which the participants viewed themselves as similar to the ingroup and the outgroup 
(Abrams and Hogg, 1990).We asked, “ How similar are your views to other 
Clinton/Trump supporters?” and with the outgroup “How similar are your views to 
the views of other Trump/Clinton supporters?”, scored using a Likert type scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).  
2. Ingroup and outgroup values. Drawn from Rokeach’s (1973) framework, we 
measured 18 terminal values (i.e., a desirable end state) and 18 instrumental values 
(i.e., preferable modes of behavior).  Participants were asked to complete this process 
twice, once to rate the extent to which they perceived the values to be held by the 
ingroup (both terminal and instrumental values), and then rate how much the same 
values are held by the other group (ingroup/outgroup order was randomized).  
Responses were recoded using 5-point Likert-style scales ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 5 (very much).   
3. Own Leader’s prototypicality. The prototypicality of the leader (candidate 
corresponding to the Party) was assessed by asking “To what extent do you think that 
the candidate embodies this group’s norms?”, scored on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (very much). 
4. Ingroup self-prototypicality. Group members’ prototypicality for their own party 
(Van Knippenberg, 2011) was assessed by asking: “As a prototypical member of the 
[Democrat/Republican as appropriate] party, I represent the interests and opinions of 
the group well.”, scored on a 5-point scale from not at all to very much.   
5. Strength of support for own candidate.  Strength of support for the candidate was 
captured using a scale ranging from 0 (lowest level of support) to 100 (highest level of 
support), with every 10% on the scale being indicated.  
6. Prior voting behavior. Past behavior was measured using a single item: “Did you 
vote in the last (general) election?” All items were scored using binary coding: 0 (no) 
and 1 (yes).  
7. Sociodemographic characteristics. Participants were asked to indicate their age, 
gender, ethnicity, educational achievement, marital status, and home ownership, using 
open ended questions.  Data were coded for analyses.  (See table notes.)  
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
To examine whether there were significant differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics profiles by group membership, we recoded membership to form a continuous 
variable and performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) (see Table 1).2 Consistent with the 
literature (Dimock, Doherty, Kile, et al., 2014; Cohen, 2018), there were three main significant 
differences between Democrat and Republican participants with regard to both age and 
homeownership status (see Table 1). Democrats were significantly younger than Republicans 
(F1,268  = 13.013, p = 0.0001; MDemocrat = 31.98, SD = 8.82; MRepublican =36.24, SD = 10.29), 
and Republicans were more likely to report owning their own homes (F1,268  = 12.440 p = 
0.0001; M Democrat= .37 or 36.8%; MRepublican = .58 or 56.2%). Turning to ethnicity and marital 
status, Democrat voters were less likely to be Caucasian or to be married than their 
Republican counterparts. The distributions indicated that there was not a great deal of 
variability within the samples, however.     
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and 2 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Role of Values  
 
 The means for each of the terminal and instrumental values attributed for each group 
were ranked (see Table 2). While there was some overlap in the items selected by each group 
(freedom and family security selected by each social group and therefore excluded from this 
analysis), there was also considerable divergence.  For Democrats, the highest ranked ingroup 
values were: “equality”, “broadmindedness”, “helpful”, “logical”; “happiness”, “world at 
peace”; and for Republicans, the highest ranked were “national security”, “sense of 
accomplishment”, “self-respect”, “ambition”, “responsibility”, and “independent”.  We used 
these two sets to represent ‘divergent’ values for the two groups. 
Next, to examine the mean outcomes on the divergent individual values items by 
group, we created four composite variables using the three most divergent value variables for 
each category: Democrat ingroup instrumental, Democrat ingroup terminal, Republican 
ingroup instrumental, Republican ingroup terminal. Following the creation of the indices, we 
tested whether their means differentiated between the groups, with significant differences 
indicating divergence in values/beliefs between the Democrats and Republican participants.  
The values significantly differed for three of the four indices (Democrat ingroup 
terminal values:  F1,268  = 15.56, p = 0.0001; M Democrat= 4.11, MRepublican = 3.73; Republican 
ingroup instrumental values: F1,268  = 17.05, p = 0.0001; M Democrat= 3.89, MRepublican = 4.29; 
Republican ingroup terminal values: F1,268  = 20.70, p = 0.0001; M Democrat= 3.75, MRepublican = 
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4.31).3  Only ingroup instrumental values for the Democrats were evaluated similarly by both 
Republicans and Democrats (F1,268  = 1.40, p = 0.183; M Democrat= 3.97, MRepublican = 3.73).  
To better understand the relationships between these values and self-ingroup similarity, self-
outgroup similarity, and self-ingroup prototypicality, we also examined the correlations for 
Democrats and Republicans separately. We controlled for prior voting behavior and the 
strength of the support for the candidate, because both variables might systematically 
influence ingroup values.4 Therefore, we used a partial correlational analysis procedure.  
Among Democrats, outgroup similarity judgments were correlated significantly with 
perceptions of ingroup values (ingroup terminal (D): pr = 0.45 , p < .01; ingroup instrumental 
(D): pr =  0.44, p < .01; ingroup terminal (R): pr = .43, p < .01; ingroup instrumental (R): pr 
= .44, p < .01).  In contrast, among Republicans, ingroup similarity judgments were 
correlated significantly with perceptions of ingroup values (ingroup terminal (D): pr = 0.39 , 
p < .01; ingroup instrumental (D): pr =  0.33, p < .01; ingroup terminal (R): pr = 0.31, p < 
.01; ingroup instrumental (R): pr = 0.39, p < .01), and Democrat instrumental  and terminal 
values were negatively correlated with Republican’s perceived ingroup similarity (outgroup 
terminal: pr = -0.16, p < .01; outgroup instrumental: pr = -0.23, p < .001), consistent with our 
values congruence hypothesis (H1) for the Republicans and our strategic identification 
assumptions (H3) for the Democrats (see Table 4).  
 
Finally, to explore group members’ assessment of leaders as “prototypical members” of the 
group (H4), we examined the partial correlations between ingroup/outgroup similarity and 
leader prototypicality.  For Democrats, there was no relationship between leader 
prototypicality and similarity with either the ingroup or outgroup. For Republicans, there was 
a significant correlation between leader prototypicality and perceived similarity with the 
ingroup (pr = 0.28, p < .01). Thus, for Republicans but not Democrats, the more that 
respondents viewed their leader as prototypical the more they also regarded themselves as 
like other ingroup members, suggesting a greater sense of coherence of the leadership and 
membership (M Democrat= 3.52, MRepublican = 3.27 Also see Table 4 - relationship between 
leader prototypicality and perceived ingroup similarity).5   
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Self-Group Similarity and Perceptions of Leaders’ Prototypicality 
 
  
A central question is whether perceived similarity with either ingroup or outgroup members 
is significantly dependent on the group (i.e., Republicans/Democrats), and whether this is 
impacted by either/both of the leaders. We also evaluated the extent to which this relationship 
may be explained by individual differences in using strength of support for the party (which 
we treat as a covariate) (H1,3).  We conducted a 2 between (Leader; Clinton vs Trump ) x 2 
within (Similarity: ingroup, outgroup) ANCOVA, using strength of support as a covariate 
(see Table 5 and Figure 1). There were significant main effects for Similarity, F(1, 297) = 
15.475, p < .001; and Leader, F(2, 296) = 148.581, p < .001, Wilks λ = .499, and significant 
simple effects of Leader for both the similarity to the ingroup (F(1, 297) = 200.010, p < .001) 
and the outgroup (F(1, 297) = 220.462, p < .001), meaning that leaders were important for 
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shaping responses both to peers and the opposition. There was also a significant effect for the 
covariate, strength of support, (F(2, 296) = 12.573, p < .001, Wilks λ = .922).   
A related question is whether the perceived prototypicality of the leader depends on 
the particular group. Given that the two groups have different values, and that the Democrat 
values are more inclusive, a social identity perspective would suggest that prototypicality 
may be stronger for Republicans, because their identity and values priorities differentiation 
from others more strongly, whereas Democrats are seeking to reinforce the connection with 
their groups (H1).   
An ANOVA comparing Democrat and Republicans’ perceptions of leader 
prototypicality revealed a marginal main effect for group membership, F(1, 247) = 3.54, p = 
.069; M Democrat= 3.72; SD = .92; MRepublican = 3.60; SD =1.00), indicating that perceptions of 
leader prototypicality do not differ strongly between the two parties. However, strength of 
support, F(10,247) = 4.00, p < .05; M Democrat= 63.78; SD = 29.75; MRepublican = 72.69; SD = 
26.98), was a significant covariate, indicating that commitment to the party and perceptions 
of leader prototypicality are positively related.  However, there was no effect of political 
party membership with strength of their support on their own representativeness, F(10, 247) 
= 0.72, p =.705; M Democrat= 3.72; SD = .92; MRepublican = 3.60; SD =1.00) (H 1,3).5  Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that the Republicans see their leader as more prototypical and 
therefore support him, despite the fact that they - on average - report themselves as less 
“prototypical” (means above). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and Figures 1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
 
In this paper, we applied an intergroup framework to explore the 2016 Presidential campaign, 
in which the Republicans and Donald Trump were victors over the Democrats and Hillary 
Clinton. According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and Abrams, 
1988), a central motive for groups and their members is to sustain and reinforce their ingroup 
identification.  More recent theory argues that group members should take advantage of 
strategic opportunities to reinforce the overall legitimacy of their identity.  Yet, the 
implications of this motivation differ for Republicans and Democrats because of their 
different value priorities.  As such, winning or losing a competitive contest concerns the 
collective future of both groups. Prior to the competition outcome, as was the case here, we 
would expect members to strongly endorse their own ingroup, reporting strong similarities 
with other members. This allows groups to be more cohesive and to have a competitive edge 
within the conflict setting.  The data reflect this difference, with Republicans endorsing their 
ingroup and thus acting consistent with the theory’s tenets (support for H1), but Democrats 
utilising a strategic identification strategy that seems to involve embracing the outgroup 
(reporting high perceived similarity with outgroup members and not the ingroup), thus 
supporting H3.    
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The Democrat Ingroup 
 
On the face of it, one might ask whether there are alternative explanations for the Democrats 
sensitivity to the opposition.  For example, one could argue that a social group, with members 
that behave in such a manner, is “disorganized”; or that they “might not know or be able to 
detect” their own ingroup values (i.e., the ingroup message is unclear). Turning to the values 
inventories, we first note that the values measures differentiated between social groups (also 
see, Rokeach, 1973; Duckitt, 2001).  That is, the values for each group were divergent, with 
Democrats for example, reporting “equality” and “broadmindedness” as central values 
(supporting H2).  Moreover, the mean scores on the scales (strength applied to their 
distinctive values) amongst for the Democrats and the Republicans, were not statistically 
different. For both groups, mean scores were above the midpoint on the scale.  In other 
words, the perceived similarity with the outgroup members was not the result of the 
Democrats “not knowing what they believed”. Likewise, the mean scores on the scales 
indicate that the pattern was not the result of a lack of engagement; there were no 
systematically low scores on the indices. Moreover, the variances in ratings of the values was 
broadly similar amongst both  Democrats and Republicans. Thus, there is no reason to 
believe that Democrats were being less systematic in their perceptions or strategies than 
Republicans’, and the data suggest that the Democrats are following a strategy that is equally 
deliberative as that by the Republicans .  
This leaves us asking, “Why are the Democrats viewing such strong similarities 
between themselves and the Republican opposition?” A review of the individual values items 
reveals that “equality” and “broadmindedness” are closely aligned with liberal values of 
individualizing (Graham, et al., 2013).  These ingroup values convey an implicit sense of 
inclusion.  To this end, Stewart and Morris (2018) demonstrated that ingroup individualizing 
values led to a reduction in intergroup bias. In other words, the group’s values facilitate a 
sense of similarity and inclusion.  Jost (2017) and others have echoed this theme, 
demonstrating that the social group is more open to tolerating uncertainty and more resilient 
to change.  This, in turn, motivates them to create a flexible superordinate identity in which 
they can integrate others (supporting H3).  Within the context of a national, intergroup 
competition, these same core values however shape the Democrat ingroup into being too 
permeable. Their flexibility directly works against the group’s cohesiveness and hampers the 
chance of a “win”.  
A last aspect that we might consider is the extent to which the group’s identity is 
internalized by the individual members, such that there is a sense of personal embeddedness. 
Here, the strategic identity hypothesis (Marques et al., 2001; H3) suggests that widening the 
scope of group membership - linked to the values of the ingroup - should mean that group 
members see themselves as less prototypic of their ingroup (less like other Democrats, 
because they are individualizing).  In part, this would transpire because they are integrating 
others and facilitating others to become part of their group and of a stronger whole (also see, 
Christian et al., 2018; Schubert & Otten, 2010). This sense of inclusion is also evident in their 
tolerance toward ambiguity and longer action times to novel stimuli and circumstance. When 
we accounted for any other personal attitudes that might be influencing their views and prior 
experiences in the analysis, there was no significant effect for self-prototypicality. Thus, the 
values are internalized by the members, as is the goal for party membership, which is to be 
“inclusive” and more tolerant. 
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The Republican Ingroup 
 
 Consistent with SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Abrams and Hogg, 1988), the Republicans 
perceived themselves to be similar to other ingroup members, and they seemed to act to 
reinforce their ingroup identification (H1).  For them, there is a clear distinction between 
Republicans and Democrats.  In line with this, they cling to the ingroup identification, 
because it helps them in their efforts to preserve social structures and ingroup values. Similar 
in process, but not outcome, to Democrats, Republicans’ identity is likely facilitated by their 
distinctive ingroup’s values – “ambitious” and concerned with “security”.  These values map 
well onto Graham et al’s., (2013) notion of “ingroup binding” values.  As outlined earlier, 
ingroup binding is predicated on the notion of “ingroup purity”, or the sense that group 
members are motivated to enhance personal self-concept by protecting the group entity. 
Turning to the Republican responses, the mean scores were high and above the 
midpoint on the scales.  That is, there was confidence in all of their responses.  However, in 
examining the scores on the items, the evidence tells a story of more extreme response 
patterns for the Republican cohort.  This highlights the group’s ability to cope with the 
interpersonal differences among its members.  That is, despite the divergent personal 
attitudes of the members (more extreme values), the group processes acted to hold the 
ingroup together. Thus, it is not the value preferences that motivate the Republicans, but the 
sense of self betterment drawn from the ingroup identity that acts as a “glue” for the 
membership. It seems plausible that the more cohesive and unified nature of the Republican 
ingroup was therefore able to “deliver a win” in the face of the competition. 
Leaders and Ingroups 
 
Strong leadership from prototypical leaders is frequently seen as an avenue to facilitate group 
cohesion – particularly if that is seen as a shortcoming. We, therefore, examined the 
perceived prototypicality of Clinton and Trump among their ingroups.  Leaders who reflect 
the “most (proto)typical views of the ingroup”, often in ways that are more extreme than 
average group members, are those who are the most frequently endorsed by their groups 
(Abrams et al., 2008). However, this may depend on whether the group’s goal is to diverge 
from the outgroup in particular ways. The present context considered a situation in which the 
goal was overall leadership supremacy, and this raises the question of whether the group’s 
value system favors simple domination or a more inclusive absorption of the outgroup.   
 
On closer review, investigating leader prototypicality, while controlling for 
interpersonal evaluations of the Republican group members, there is clear support that the 
ingroup viewed Trump as a “normative leader”.  This is in line with Krishnan (2001) who 
argues that the match between campaign messages and the ingroup values would be enough 
for him to be seen as normative – this was enough to consolidate the ingroup with him during 
the competition (H4). 
 
In the same way, we also reviewed the mean score, as well as the relationship 
between outgroup identification (the Democrats’ construal of their group) controlling for 
interpersonal preferences of the ingroup members.  Similarly, a straightforward read of the 
mean on the scale would indicate that Clinton was evaluated as being a prototypical leader.  
However, when group-level perceptions (strength of member similarity; identification) are 
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reviewed, controlling for the individual ones, there is a very different story – one in which 
she is not seen as normative (H4).  We can only speculate as to the reasons motivating this.  
The evidence suggests that factors, such as “traditional career path”, might be important 
when the variable is not viewed within the context of ingroup values.  However, when 
prototypicality of the leader is viewed within this framework the lens that is used by ingroup 
members is rooted in Democrat’s path of inclusiveness.  As outlined above, the problem with 
the inclusiveness strategy as applied here is that rather than members drawing a sense of 
distinctiveness from the Democrat party affiliation, the they draw esteem by integrating 
others into their party (also see Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins 2005).  This emphasis on the 
collective approach, ironically, works against Clinton hampering Democrat supporter’s 
ability to perceive her as delivering on and embodying the group’s values. This outcome 
occurs because the group becomes too flexible with the inclusion of the opposition. And, in 
turn, the absence of this endorsement for the leader and the use of this integration strategy 
worked to undermine the chance of a Democrat “win”. 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, group processes, particularly social identity processes and group values, may have 
had a great deal to do with the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential election. The Democrats’ 
approach, which valued inclusion and led to more positive views of outgroup members, 
compared with the stronger ingroup cohesiveness of Republicans, likely contributed to the 
Democrats’ loss in this competitive election. It is important to note that when groups must 
share a common environment after a competition, the inclusiveness approach of the 
Democrats would likely work to pull the competing parties together. However, a strategic and 
more inclusive approach that looks for cooperation before the competition is won, results in 
too much integration and loss of momentum for the group. 
It is also important to point out that the strategy of the Republican ingroup to “win” 
the election is not one that is optimal for the “battle” of holding leadership after the election.  
Social identity theory indicates that acquiring new members is done under a limited range of 
conditions. The strongest option for the Republicans, having “won”, would be to take a leaf 
out of the Democrats’ “playbook” -  for continued ingroup validation and positive identity the 
“winners” should embrace as many Democrat outgroup members as possible to grow the 
ingroup (also see, Barbera et al., 2015; Piurko, 2011).  Time will tell how this is 
implemented. 
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Footnotes 
1 There are large literatures investigating changes to the female stereotype (Deikman and 
Eagly, 2000; Eagly and Steffen, 1984) and women in leadership (see, Eagly and Karau 2002; 
Ryan and Haslam, 2005). Both of these bodies of work are relevant for those interested in 
further exploring the impact that such factors might have had on Clinton’s aspirations for 
leadership.  Also, in this study please note, that we are focusing on the extent to which the 
leader reflects the group's prototypic behaviours.    
2 We have recoded as interval variables as indicated in the Table note attached to Table 1.  
However, if the analysis is conducted using two groups, Democrats and Republicans, and 
tested with a t-test procedure, the results are similar: Democrat ingroup terminal values: 
MDemocrat = 4.11, MRepublican = 3.73; t (269) = 3.94, p = 0.0001; Republican ingroup 
instrumental values: MDemocrat = 3.89, MRepublican = 4.29; t (267) = 4.135, p = 0.0001; 
Republican ingroup terminal values: MDemocrat = 3.75, MRepublican = 4.31; t (267) = 6.177, p = 
0.0001).  Only ingroup instrumental values for the Democrats was evaluated similarly by 
both Republicans and Democrats (MDemocrat = 3.97; MRepublican = 3.82; t (269) = 1.335, p = 
n.s.). 
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3 The pattern of correlations was not significantly different when we did not control for the 
strength of attitudes.  For example, the correlation between ingroup similarity and leader 
prototypicality is: r = .272, p <  0.001 for Republicans; for Democrats, the association 
between outgroup similarity and leader prototypicality is: r = 0.129, p = n.s. (the outgroup 
being the “ingroup” for the Democrats).  3 The pattern of correlations was not significantly 
different when we did not control for the strength of attitudes.  For example, the correlation 
between ingroup similarity and leader prototypicality is: r = .272, p <  0.001 for Republicans; 
for Democrats, the association between outgroup similarity and leader prototypicality is: r = 
0.129, p = n.s. (the outgroup being the “ingroup” for the Democrats).   
4 To check for possible restrictions in range that might potentially have affected the 
correlations we examined the means and standard deviations associated with the individual 
variables used to create the indices (above). A review of means showed that they were similar 
across both groups, above the mid-point on the scale (5 pt. scale with average of top 3 
distinctive items) (Democrats: 4.09 (terminal), 3.61 (instrumental); Republicans: 4.23 
(terminal), 4.27 (instrumental)). Only low means, below mid-point, would signal a lack of 
consensus for either of the groups (see Table 4).  The standard deviations for the values 
variables (items used to create indices) was somewhat narrower for the Democrat (0.89-1.00) 
participants than for their Republican counterparts (0.65-1.06). (See Tables 2 and 3). Overall 
then, there seems little basis to believe that either mean level responses or differences in 
variance had a bearing on the pattern of correlations.  
 
5 The test the significance of the difference between correlational coefficients, we compared 
the correlation of each value with the ingroup similarity versus outgroup similarity (e.g. 
Democrats: -.11,   0.44; see Table 4 for coefficients) The Z-tests results for the Democrats are 
as follows: Democrat instrumental values: Z = -4.55, p = .001; Democrat terminal values: Z = 
-4.89, p < 0.001; Republican instrumental values: Z = -4.22, p  < 0.001; Republican terminal 
values: Z = -4.31, p < 0.001; Leader prototypicality and ingroup/outgroup similarity: Z = -.16, 
p = 0.87; Self-prototypicality and ingroup/outgroup similarity. Z= -3.44, p  < 0.001.  
Conversely, the Z-test results for the Republicans are: Republican instrumental values: Z = 
4.77, p < 0.001; Republican terminal values: Z = 4.41, p < 0.001; Democrat instrumental 
values: Z = 5.25, p  <  0.001; Democrat terminal values: Z = 4.60, p  <  0.001; Leader 
prototypicality and ingroup/outgroup similarity: Z = 2.05, p < 0.01; Self-prototypicality and 
ingroup/outgroup similarity. Z= 6.96, p  < 0.0001.   
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Table 1: Effects of Sociodemographic Variables and Group Membership   
Variable Social Group M/%  SD Df F 
1. Age Democrat 31.98 .45 1, 268 13.013** 
 Republican 36.24 .36 1, 268  
2. Gender Democrat 44.8% - 1, 268 2.18 
 Republican 36.3% - 1, 268  
3. Ethnicity Democrat 69.6% - 1, 265 5.04* 
 Republican 82.2% - 1, 265  
4. Education Democrat 76.8% - 1, 260 0.0034 
 Republican 78.8% - 1, 260  
5. Marital Status Democrat 28.8% - 1, 268 9.64** 
 Republican 47.3% - 1, 268  
6. Home Owner  Democrat 36.8%  1, 268 12.440*** 
 Republican 56.2%  1, 268  
7. Prior Voting 
Behavior Democrat 76.8%  1, 297 .014 
 Republican 77.4%  1, 297  
 
Note: Group membership was recoded (0) non-Democrat, (1) Democrat; gender: (0) non-
female (1) female (percentage reported reflects proportion of women); ethnicity: (0) non-
Caucasian (1) Caucasian (percentage reported reflects proportion of Caucasian participants); 
education: (0) not reporting college education (1) reporting college educated (percentage 
reported reflects proportion of those reporting college education including Masters and PhD 
degrees); marital status: (0) non-married (including, single, divorced but not cohabitating) (1) 
married (percentage reported reflects married participants); age, home ownership, and 
behavior were continuous variables prior to analysis. 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < 0.0001 
 
 
 
LEADERSHIP AND GROUP PROCESSES  
16 
 
 
Table 2 –Descriptives for Values, Democrats 
Ranking Ingroup Terminal  M SD 
1 Equality 4.32 0.91 
2 Freedom 4.05 0.91 
3 A World at Peace 4.00 0.96 
4 Happiness 3.95 0.89 
5 Family Security 3.90 0.86 
6 Self-Respect 3.90 0.92 
7 A World of Beauty 3.74 1.07 
8 A Sense of Accomplishment 3.73 0.95 
9 Inner Harmony 3.65 0.97 
10 Wisdom 3.64 1.01 
11 National Security 3.60 1.02 
12 Social Recognition 3.60 0.95 
13 A Comfortable Life 3.53 0.87 
14 True Friendship 3.50 0.99 
15 Mature Love 3.48 1.10 
16 Pleasure 3.47 0.90 
17 An Exciting Life 3.19 0.89 
18 Salvation 2.89 1.18 
Ranking Ingroup Instrumental M SD 
1 Broadminded 4.00 1.00 
2 Helpful 3.98 0.94 
3 Capable 3.95 0.94 
4 Logical 3.94 0.87 
5 Intellectual 3.93 0.99 
6 Responsible 3.90 0.93 
7 Ambitious 3.80 0.95 
8 Self-Controlled 3.79 0.91 
9 Forgiving 3.76 1.01 
10 Polite 3.70 0.98 
11 Clean 3.69 0.99 
12 Courageous 3.69 1.03 
13 Independent 3.63 1.07 
14 Loving 3.62 1.01 
15 Cheerful 3.60 0.97 
16 Honest 3.60 1.01 
17 Imaginative 3.58 1.02 
18 Obedient 3.23 1.06 
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Table 3 –Descriptives for Values, Republicans 
Ranking Ingroup Terminal M SD 
1 National Security 4.61 0.65 
2 Freedom 4.44 0.88 
3 Family Security 4.39 0.88 
4 A Sense of Accomplishment 4.22 0.93 
5 Self-Respect 4.11 0.94 
6 Happiness 4.10 0.92 
7 Wisdom 3.95 1.03 
8 A Comfortable Life 3.93 0.90 
9 A World at Peace 3.68 0.94 
10 Social Recognition 3.67 1.03 
11 Salvation 3.66 1.07 
12 Mature Love 3.60 1.13 
13 Inner Harmony 3.55 1.12 
14 True Friendship 3.54 1.12 
15 Equality 3.42 1.09 
16 A World of Beauty 3.39 1.11 
17 Pleasure 3.33 1.12 
18 An Exciting Life 3.18 1.1 
Ranking Ingroup Instrumental M SD 
1 Responsible 4.33 0.88 
2 Ambitious 4.26 0.94 
3 Capable 4.26 0.91 
4 Logical 4.24 0.93 
5 Independent 4.13 1.06 
6 Self-Controlled 4.11 0.95 
7 Courageous 4.09 0.97 
8 Intellectual 4.07 0.98 
9 Clean 4.01 1.02 
10 Honest 4.00 1.03 
11 Helpful 3.86 1.06 
12 Polite 3.78 0.97 
13 Loving 3.61 1.04 
14 Obedient 3.61 1.06 
15 Cheerful 3.55 1.05 
16 Broadminded 3.53 1.12 
17 Forgiving 3.43 1.10 
18 Imaginative 3.42 1.11 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Intercorrelations (Republicans below the diagonal (n = 145); Democrats above the diagonal (n=125))5 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ingroup Similarity 3.79 (1.72) 0.97 (0.83) -- -0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 0.131 ns 
2. Outgroup Similarity 1.79 (3.88) 0.80 (0.91) -0.27* --  0.44***  0.45*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.11 0.525*** 
3. Ingroup Instrumental Values 
Democrat 3.81 (3.97) 0.92 (0.84)  0.39*** -0.23* -- 0.71*** 0.59*** 0.73*** 0.04 0.206* 
4. Ingroup Terminal Values 
Democrat 3.75 (4.11) 0.79 (0.78)  0.33*** -0.22*  0.73*** -- 0.66*** 0.70*** 0.14 0.248** 
5. Ingroup Terminal Values 
Republican 4.34 (3.77) 0.68 (0.78)  0.39*** -0.13  0.46***  0.51*** -- 0.77*** 0.27** 0.283** 
6. Ingroup Instrumental Values 
Republican 4.29 (3.91) 0.80 (0.78)  0.31*** -0.26*  0.60***  0.61***  0.72*** -- 0.21* 0.321*** 
7. Leader Prototypicality 3.27 (3.52) 1.02 (0.94)  0.28** -0.02  0.29***  0.33***  0.23* 0.24* --  0.267* 
8. Self-Prototypicality 3.58 (3.70) 1.00 (0.92)  0.626*** -0.121 ns  0.515***  0.519***  0.433*** 0.409*** 0.375*** -- 
 * p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < 0.0001. 
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Table 5 – Means for Perceived Similarity of Views (Ingroup and Outgroup) by Leader 
  Ingroup Similarity Outgroup Similarity 
Candidate M SD M SD 
Hillary Clinton 2.03 1.12 3.55 1.19 
Donald Trump 3.79 0.96 1.80 0.79 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effects of Conditions on Similarity of Views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
